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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the aftermath of the bursting of the housing bubble in Spain, which 
has left thousands of families without homes and indebted for life. In the first of two 
parts we look at contextually specific interactions between state regulation and market-
oriented projects in Spain. This country is a salient case in which an economic recession 
and a debt crisis follow upon a long period of growth characterized by a housing bubble 
and a particular urban growth model. In this part we argue that the central government 
has played a key role in framing fiscal incentives for housing ownership, and local and 
regional administrations have engaged in short-term forms of inter-spatial competition 
for public and private resources, place marketing and regulatory under-cutting in order 
to attract investment. In the second part, the paper examines the urban social movement 
“Platform of Mortgage Victims” that, after starting in Barcelona, has spread to many 
other cities. The movement has created innovative strategies for housing accessibility 
and public and private governance in the housing market. These strategies include 
innovations at the local level and at national and European institutional levels. In this 
part we argue that social movements like the one we study are socially innovative when 
they aim at responding to social needs not met by the market and the state institutions. 
At the same time with their activism they transform the debate in the public sphere while 
prompting institutions to introduce new governance mechanisms and policy outcomes.  
Key Words: Social innovation, housing crisis, multi-level governance, urban 
social movement 
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Housing crisis: the Platform of Mortgage Victims (PAH) 
movement in Barcelona and innovations in governance 
1. Introduction 
This paperi analyses the innovative strategies of an urban social movement created in 
response to the effects of the housing crisis. The bursting of the housing bubble in 2008 
had a great impact on Spanish citizens. The PAH (Platform of Mortgage Victims) was 
founded in Barcelona in 2009, and spread rapidly all over Spain to cope with the social 
exclusionary dynamics of the crisis and respond to new needs. We look at PAH’s actions 
from a social innovation perspective (Moulaert, et al., 2013) focussing on actors’ 
innovative strategies and the governance innovation they introduce through dealing with 
victims of the housing crisis in Spain. The movement’s strength and impact are closely 
related to the size of the housing bubble in each region and to the organizational capacity 
of its members. The strength and the success of the movement is also related to 
innovative collective strategies implemented by the leaders of the movement and the 
broad social base of the social action. We review the importance of homeownership in 
Spain and show the institutional and sociological factors accompanying the housing 
bubble and outline our analytical framework based on a social innovation approach. We 
then show the bottom-up and bottom-linked objectives and strategies of the PAH 
movement that influenced public opinion and brought changes in governance and 
discuss the particular innovative governance created in Barcelona. Finally, we include a 
brief media analysis of the impact of the movement. 
2. The case: research question and context 
The negative consequences of the housing-bubble burst in Spain greatly affected the 
population, especially house owners unable to pay off their mortgages due to widespread 
unemployment.  
What collective social action emerged in cities in general and in Barcelona in particular? 
What were the institutional responses to bottom-up strategies? What internal and 
external governance developed in the movement against evictions? 
2.1. The Spanish housing property prevalence 
The housing property market was prominent in the Spanish economy since the 1960s. 
The interaction between the real estate market, welfare policies and family solidarity 
determined the country’s current urbanization model. Rapidly changing sociological and 
economic factors made Spain into one of the largest homeownership countries in Europe: 
85% of total housing stock in 2012 (CECODHAS, 2011). Several factors influenced the 
supply of housing over the last decades: demographic (boom generation accessing 
housing and high rate of international immigration), economic (investment returns and 
tourist industry), social (family solidarity) and cultural (second residence as a 
consumption pattern of upper and middle classes) (Garcia, 2010). By the 1990s the real 
estate sector was already important in the Spanish economy. However, the latest growth 
cycle (from the 1990s onwards) saw an acceleration of housing production combined 
with a long period of rising housing-prices linked to globalization factors (foreign 
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investment, low interests rates and large demand fuelled by immigration) as well as an 
urbanization model based on high- and low-density supply and high demand for second-
residences partly linked to tourism.  
The rapid urbanization growth model over the last few decades allowed Spain to 
compete with the biggest economies of the EU ii. Financial deregulation and falling 
interest rates made mortgages accessible and resulted in more owner-occupied housing 
- a general trend observed all over Europe (CECODHAS, 2011). More than 6.5 million 
housing units were built in Spain during the economic boom. 
Although housing production increased every year - four times more houses were 
produced in 2006 than in 1995 – and the number of new households did not increase 
proportionally, housing accessibility became more costly. Between 1998 and 2007 
housing prices triplediii (Garcia Montalvo, 2009). Most of the housing production was 
intended for sale while the rental market decreased considerably since the 1950s. Also, 
social housing production – even though almost inexistent - was mostly intended for 
sale. This, together with a lack of incentives to ensure a stable and accessible rental 
market, left few options to those wanting to establish new households. Home ownership 
became a feature of the Spanish urban growth model, fixed by the time the housing 
bubble burst: 84.5%, in comparison with only 12.2% of rental housing available (2.3 % 
other types) (Pareja-Eastway & Varo, 2002).  
2.2. State incentives 
Regulations to protect tenants by freezing rents and make evictions difficult together 
with high inflation in mid 20th century made it economically uninteresting to invest in 
rental real estate or for landlords to let and maintain buildings. In the 60s new 
regulations allowed the sale of houses and flats to long-term tenants at very low prices 
and incentivized new housing (Cabré & Modenes, 2004). This, together with the 
inexistence of land use regulations stimulated real-estate investment which gradually led 
to the construction sector becoming an important factor in Spanish economic growth. 
Two state-led policies further stoked the housing bubble. One concerned housing 
supply: Municipalities received tax benefits from housing production. On the demand 
side: fiscal incentives spurred families to buy housing. When finally regional and local 
governments drew up regulations to contain land speculation the urbanization process 
had already exploded.  
Municipalities engaged in real estate boosterism, albeit to different degrees. 
Modifying land-use classifications attracted constructors and entrepreneurs to invest in 
their territories. In cities like Valencia this led to a “growth-machine” type of expansion 
centred on land valorisation and rent production. Elsewhere economic growth was 
accompanied by redistribution policies (foremost Barcelona and Bilbao). The ideology of 
urban policy stimulating urban competitiveness through attracting investments from the 
construction sector spread among cities, more so in Madrid and Valencia than in 
Barcelona and Bilbao (Díaz Orueta, 2012).  
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Both conservative and social-democratic governments consolidated fiscal 
incentives for housing ownership from the reinstatement of democratic government 
(1976) until late 2012. Tax deduction for home-owners benefited buyers but also, and 
mainly, real-estate developers, builders and investors since this fiscal policy contributed 
indirectly housing price increases. Furthermore, public authorities in charge of housing 
promoted the purchase of real estate as a safe and good investment (Colau & Alemany, 
2012). 
2.3. The economic crisis: unemployment and housing evictions 
Economic expansion since the mid 1990s, centred on construction and real estate, 
yielded many new jobs. However, since the start of the crisis in late 2008 job destruction 
occurred at a similarly high rate as its earlier creation (European Commission, 2012). By 
the end of 2011 almost 2.5 million jobs were lost, more than 1.4 million in the 
construction industry.  
Since the crisis began millions of citizens lost their jobs with many unable to pay 
their mortgage bills. What the “buyers-to-be-debtors” did not know – upon signing the 
mortgage loan – was that in case of default, besides expropriation and eviction, this 
would result into lifelong indebtedness, condemning them to poverty and social 
exclusioniv. During the years of the crisis more than 400,000v mortgages were foreclosed 
throughout Spain, affecting many thousands of households (see Figure 3). The effects 
of the housing bubble burst have been more visible involving stricken families but 
bankruptcies of real-estate companies had a much bigger impact on banking sector 
losses. 
2.4. European governance and crisis management 
European governance can be considered yet another factor in the recent housing crisis 
in Spain. Upon entering the euro area, Spain and other Southern European countries lost 
the possibility of devaluing their currency as an instrument to protect their domestic 
industries. Inflows of capital to these EU countries were supposed to promote a process 
of economic convergence with Northern countries. But in some countries they basically 
fuelled consumption and the growth of bubbles in asset prices. This was the case of 
Spain were the housing market and tourism grew dramatically. The construction firms 
also profited from many infrastructure project partly finance by EU Structural funds 
(Etxezarreta et al., 2011). While the housing market was exploding with a boom in real 
estate, industrial companies faced difficulties in keeping up with high prices. 
International competitiveness suffered. As a result the current account deficit grew from 
3.9% of GDP in 2001 to 10% in 2007. This deficit was financed by capital inflows, 
particularly loans from German and other foreign banks, made easier by the deregulation 
of the EU financial services sector. (Euromemorandum, 2013, 8-31).  
 
With the financial crisis 2008 the money influx stopped for companies and 
families. This led to payment arrears by developers, builders and buyers. By the end of 
2011 the index of non-performing housing related credits was 20.9% for developers, 
17.7% for builders and 2.8% for buyers. Even if repossession from buyers increased as 
many of them lost their jobs, housing owners were not the main debtors. These were 
developers and builders, which made Spanish banks the largest real estate managers 
since the housing bubble burst. (Rodríguez López, El Pais, 9/6/2012).  
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Governance changes were introduced in the EU in response to the crisis of 
government debts affecting countries that lost the confidence of the international 
financial markets. As the money influx stopped abruptly with the 2008 financial crisis in 
Southern European countries these EU changes involved a comprehensive system of 
tutelage with pressure for expenditure cuts in exchange for access to finance. The 
Spanish government officially asked for a European “bailout” for the Spanish banks to 
amounting 100.000 million Euros and received it on condition that the Spanish state 
would guarantee the return of the European credit. That is, the loan would directly 
increase Spanish government debt (Eurostat, 2012). In other words what was a private 
debt became a public debt to be paid by Spanish citizens. This transfer from private to 
public debt was, and is, accompanied by a strict austerity programme, not only involving 
an internal devaluation of workers’ wages, a further expansion of job destruction in the 
private and public sectors, but also the retrenchment of the welfare state and social 
entitlements.  
 
2.5. Mortgage Legislation 
To understand the problem of over-indebtedness and housing eviction among Spanish 
citizens we need to refer to the norms regulating the eviction process and mortgage 
legislation. Over the years the Mortgage Lawvi was eased several times to boost the 
national economy and financial markets, leading to deregulation and more financial risk. 
For example, until March 2013, there was no maximum interest on arrears which led to 
cases of more than 30% interest rate. After the European Court of Justice ruling, the 
Spanish government had to adapt the legislation to European standards.  
The Code of Civil Procedurevii which regulates the eviction process in case of non-
payment of debts creates an imbalance, protecting financial institutions more than 
individual debtors. The eviction process could start after only one month of arrears, and 
the financial institution could take over the property in an auction for minimum 50% of 
the initial taxation price (now changed to 60%). This leaves the mortgagor with plenty 
to pay in order to settle the debt. Article 1911 of the Civil Procedure states that the 
debtor has to meet the debt with all his present and future goods. Until the recent 
adjustments in 2012 and 2013 the debtor could not defend himself in court during the 
eviction process viii  (even when the mortgage contract contained abusive clauses), 
without any option for debt settlement or individual bankruptcy.  
3. The PAH movement: a social actor of bottom-up social innovation 
Bottom-up strategies leading to social innovation emerge when organized citizens who 
may disagree with mainstream policy implementations put forward alternative ways of 
addressing new risks not envisaged by public and market institutions. Two related issues 
need addressing: 1) the innovative processes to obtain resources to meet emerging and 
unsatisfied social needs, and 2) the way these processes can lead to a transformation of 
governance mechanisms, with possible changes in power relations in areas that deal 
with social exclusion dynamics (Pradel, et al., 2013, 156).  
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Bottom-up strategies often remain local and only reach the level of municipal 
governance structures. The actors of such strategies have limited networking capacity, 
cannot engage a wider public, or reach regional and national administrations. How much 
different kinds of actors engaged in social innovation can influence policy in a multi-level 
context is an open question, subject to empirical analysis (García 2006; Moulaert et al. 
2007). In the case of PAH there was rapid growth from a small group of citizens, 
organized around housingix and other social issues, to a large movement capable of 
changing the framework surrounding the eviction problem, while creating nation-wide 
awareness of this social injustice. The PAH resembles a social movement dealing with 
grievancesx affecting people who cannot meet their mortgage obligations and are evicted 
from their homes while still having to pay the accumulated debt. 
We first analyse the PAH as a social movement with its objective, strategies and 
campaigns. We then look at it as a socially innovative actor and analyse its internal and 
external governance relations. Lastly we discuss the impacts the mobilization has had on 
governance processes and how it inspired other innovative initiatives.  
Figure 1. Analytical frame 
 
Based on Moulaert et al. (2007) 
 
The proposed analytical frame includes: (a) the context (economic and financial crisis; 
collapse of the housing bubble; high unemployment; deprivation of housing and a 
process of social exclusion; (b) mobilization of resources by civil-society actors and public 
institutions; (c) the resulting social and institutional innovation involving satisfaction of 
the need for housing, empowerment of people affected by the mortgage crisis and 
changes in governance as a result of civil-society and institutional action. This social and 
institutional innovation can lead to “bottom-linked” innovation. 
3.1. Methodology 
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Our analysis is based on statistics from EUROSTAT, the Centre of Sociological Research 
(CIS), the National Institute of Statistics and Judiciary statistics. We also rely on 
participant observation, 10 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and public 
institutions officials, our own elaboration of a database on media attention, attendance 
at PAH reunions, on-line documents of the PAH, protocols and data of eviction cases. In 
addition, a local Stake-holders workshopxi was organized gathering representatives of 
various social and institutional initiatives and other housing stakeholders. Empirical 
research was done between April and September 2013.  
3.2. The rise and expansion of the Platform of Mortgage Victims (PAH) 
After its 2009 emergence in Barcelona, the PAH gradually spread to other cities of the 
Barcelona region and the rest of Spain reaching 10 local platforms by mid-2011. In May 
of that year, after the 15M mobilizations and the start of the “Indignados” movement, 
the PAH started growing exponentially throughout Spain, reaching 144 platforms in 
spring 2013 and 205 early 2014.  
The PAH became a social movement capable of influencing public opinion and of 
providing innovative collective strategies, such as collective re-negotiation of mortgage 
debts with financial institutions to support affected families. By 2013 the movement 
covered all 17 regions (Autonomous Communities) of Spain. It is organized horizontally 
with local divisions and representatives meeting and acting locally. Each Autonomous 
Community has at least 1 local platform with many more in Catalonia and Valencia 
(Figure 2). This reflects how the movement expanded from its early roots in Barcelona 
throughout the rest of the country. The density of platforms in an area correlates with 
the evictions occurring in that area. Where the crisis was acute (the areas where the 
housing bubble was bigger: the Mediterranean coastline), more platforms were 
developed (see Figure 3). 
Figure 2. Number of local Platforms per Region. 2013 
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Source: authors’ elaboration with data from PAHxii 
Figure 3. Housing evictions, Mortgage foreclosures & Empty dwellings per 
Autonomous Community 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration with data from INE and Judiciary Statisticsxiii 
 
 
In Catalonia the locally organized platforms meet regularly in assemblies where 
they offer collective advice and support. Members of the platforms explain and lecture 
on the eviction process in public gatherings while emphasizing values of mutual support 
and solidarity. The concerns of whoever approaches them with a housing eviction 
problem are discussed publicly. Every platform has a webpage or Facebook group to 
communicate their actions, and to share information and documents for use in fighting 
the eviction process in court or in the financial institution.  
One strength of the PAH movement is its capacity to capture media attention. It 
gains visibility as a movement and more importantly makes visible the tragedy of 
hundreds of thousands of families that are threatened with losing their homes. In this 
way it managed to transform what was originally conceptualised by financial institutions 
as individual problems into a collective issue (Colau & Alemany, 2012) going beyond (up-
scaled) the local and national territory and reaching the European scale. More on this 
later 
3.3. The PAH as an innovative actor: Strategies & Objectives 
The Platform of Mortgage Victims empowers people through innovative actions 
based on solidarity. It fights recent exclusionary dynamics of financial and material 
deprivation resulting from the housing crisis by giving them instruments to respond to 
the threats from financial, judiciary and government institutions. Financial institutions 
are forced into debt renegotiation, communication with the debtors and even debt 
settlement. By thoroughly investigating the judicial eviction process and the Mortgage 
law the PAH has elaborated documents and ready-to-use forms to oblige targeted 
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institutions into debt mediation. By organising collectively they can exert pressure on the 
multiple actors involved in the eviction process such as legislative bodies and other 
institutions at local, regional and even international level.  
In general PAH strives to change practices through a temporary suspension of 
evictions and through a change in the law regulating payment in kind (by returning the 
house to the bank). It pressures private and public institutions to augment the rental 
social-housing stock, for example by transforming evicted apartments or empty building 
blocks into social housing. Currently only 2% of the total housing stock is intended for 
social rents (CECODHAS, 2011): largely insufficient to satisfy demand. 
One PAH objective was always to find out how evictions are affecting the 
population and bring this problematic to public attention. They wanted to create 
awareness among Spanish citizens and institutions that the debt problems experienced 
in Spanish households are not the result of individual failure but a consequence of 
decades of housing politics and financial and economic decisions. Their actions in the 
public sphere comprised mass protests against government institutions at local, regional 
and national level. Financial institutions were also targeted with demonstrations and 
actions. In this way PAH managed to acquire visibility and reputation among most of the 
Spanish population by the end of 2012. In March 2013 the movement enjoyed the 
support of 81% of the Spaniardsxiv whereas only 10%xv of the population reported 
trusting the government system.  
Beyond raising awareness and functioning as a protest movement, the PAH 
developed innovative strategies and actions to respond practically to the housing crisis. 
It organizes and develops services and documents to meet the newly arisen social needs: 
providing knowledge on the eviction process, tools for debt negotiation, mutual support 
in situations of distress. When someone is evicted, for example, the adherents of the 
local platform will block the entrance of the home-to-be-evicted in order to stop or 
postpone the eviction and to gain time for negotiation with the financial institution. 
Through sharing knowledge and experience of the eviction process during the weekly 
collective advice assemblies people are empowered through information exchange and 
guidance during the eviction process. Furthermore, accessible documents to enforce a 
revision of the mortgage contract are provided and, most importantly, victims will find 
support and recognition from people experiencing similar debt issues. Another innovative 
way to resist the pressure of financial institutions are the collective negotiation groups - 
organized per financial institution - to exert joint pressure in the renegotiation of 
mortgage contracts, to enforce payment in kind or a social rent. If eviction cannot be 
prevented and the victims cannot find alternative housing through social services or with 
relatives, they can be lodged in one of the blocks occupied by the PAH. The occupation 
of empty building blocks accompanied a well-thought-out campaign pressuring the 
government to meet the enormous need for social housing and oblige financial 
institutions to offer their empty buildings for rent. The occupation of these buildings is, 
in addition to its housing function, used as a pressure instrument in negotiations with 
the financial institution (owner of the building) to obtain legal contracts of social rent for 
families needing housing. In this way the PAH tries to secure its ultimate goal: 
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satisfaction of the human need for housing. In February 2014, 8 months after the start 
of the collective occupation of building blocks, 20 blocks were occupied, sheltering 1049 
people.  
At the local level the PAH started cooperating with lawyers elaborating a proposal 
to modify the Mortgage Law and the Code on Civil Procedure seeking to redress the 
imbalance between individual debtors and financial institutions. In 2010 the local 
platform in Barcelona presented, with the support of the Defence Committee of the 
college of Lawyers of Barcelona and other civil society actors, this motion to the city 
council. Some left-wing political parties expressed their interestxvi and gradually more 
local platforms started presenting these motions to their municipalities.  
3.4. PAH social action at other geographical scales  
The PAH has also urged legislation for structural changes in housing politics. Institutions 
at different levels of governance are challenged to declare themselves and take a position 
on the practices of forced eviction and mortgage foreclosures.  
In Catalonia, a new motion was prepared in 2014, based on the regional 
legislation on Right to Housing xvii , providing legal grounds to municipalities and 
Autonomous Community governments to fine financial institutions for vacant housing 
property. By late January 2014, 148 municipalitiesxviii in Catalonia and the rest of Spain 
had signed these motions, openly supporting the PAH and thereby disputing the political 
legitimacy of the national government. Some municipalities have started actions 
themselves by pressuring financial institutions or suspending the value added tax in 
cases of accord and satisfaction agreements over the mortgaged good. Regionally the 
most ambitious initiative so far (May 2013) belongs to the Andalusian parliamentxix. 
To reshape national legislation the PAH started the People’s Legislative Initiative 
(ILP). Mobilizations started in February 2012 and one year later had collected almost 
triple the officially required number of signatures (1,402,854) to propose legislation, 
reflecting the wide support and visibility the PAH gained during the ILP campaign. This 
coincided with the organization of their controversial “escraches”: protests staged 
outside the homes of politicians, and with the ruling of European Court of Justice on the 
legitimacy of the Spanish mortgage legislation. Also in this period – February and April 
2013 - the charismatic leader of the PAH was invited to talk in both the Spanish Chamber 
of Deputies and the European Commission. These events yielded extensive media 
attention on the precarious situation of the Spanish mortgage debtors and the 
impossibility for individuals to plead their case in court, even though the contracts often 
contained abusive clauses.  
The ILP demands halting people’s forced evictions as long as authorities do not 
provide alternative housing for them. Secondly it requests changing legislation to make 
possible payment of the remaining mortgage debt in kind (by handing over the house) 
and thereby allowing the former homeowners to stay in the property paying a social 
rent. During the ILP campaign, two law amendments were implemented. The first one 
in November 2012, prescribing the temporary suspension of evictions of families 
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considered as particularly vulnerablexx. The second onexxi, in May 2013, under pressure 
of the ILP and the judgment of the European Court of Justice, allows debtors to defend 
their case in court in the case of abusive clauses in the mortgage contract. It limits the 
maximum interest on arrears, extends the period for starting the mortgage eviction from 
one to three months of delayed payment and recommends the creation of 6000 social 
housing units. Clearly, these law amendments remain minimal and only under very strict 
and extreme conditions is debt settlement allowed. However, this legal change and the 
internationalization (up-scaling) of the problem have led to some social innovation in 
power relations between mortgage debtors and creditors. 
Table 1. Strategies, Campaigns, Scales of Action and type of Mobilization   
Movement 
Strategies 
Action Repertoire 
Territorial Level 
 
Confrontational 
 
Influence Public 
Opinion & 
Visibility 
Traditional Media Attention National - Regional no 
Posters Neighbourhood no 
Demonstrations National – Regional – Municipal yes 
Documentaries  National no 
Mass-self Communication & 
Self-Mediation  
International – National - Local no 
Website National - Municipal no 
Mobilizing 
Constituents 
Multi-media & Assemblies Neighbourhood no 
Protest  
Blockade entrance house for 
stopping evictions 
Neighbourhood yes 
Demonstrations Municipal yes 
Mass-self Communication National yes 
Occupying Municipal yes 
Collective 
Negotiation with 
banks 
Occupation of offices & Read 
Manifest 
Municipal yes 
Bundle Cases Municipal no 
"Escraches" 
Demonstration in front of 
politicians’ homes 
Neighbourhood yes 
Read Manifest - stories of 
affected 
Neighbourhood no 
Placemaking: stickers Neighbourhood no 
Letters to Politicians National no 
Media attention National no 
Mass-self Communication National no 
Law Change (ILP) 
Signatures National no 
Demonstrations National yes 
Interaction with 
public institutions 
Motions Municipal no 
 Regional no 
Participation in roundtable 
housing 
Municipal no 
Collective Advice Assemblies Municipal no 
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Source: Author’s elaboration with data from interviews, participant observation and PAH website 
3.5. Visibility: impacts on media and public opinion  
The PAH was formed in February 2009, but it took two years to gain media notice. The 
emergence of the 15M movement and the simultaneous demonstrations in 50 Spanish 
cities on the 15th of May 2011 was the turning point for the PAH. They were regularly 
mentioned in the news and caught the attention of the wider population. The following 
chart shows the media coverage given to the mortgage payment problems and evictions 
related to the PAH in the national newspaper EL PAIS, selected for its widest media 
impact. 
Figure 4: Media Coverage on PAH in El País 
 
Source: Elaboration of authors with data collected from newspaper articles “El País” 
(From 8/02/2012 onwards all articles published online are also taken into consideration) 
 
With the start of the People’s Legislative Initiative and the related mobilizations, 
media attention started rising exponentially in the second quarter of 2012. This period 
coincides with the mobilizations and reports on the first anniversary of the 15M, the 
appearance of the charismatic leader of the PAH in the Chamber of Deputies and the 
verdict of the European Court of Justice on the Spanish mortgage legislation. The PAH 
was breaking news.  
Increased media attention induced ever more people to reach out to PAH for help 
and support. The movement grew in numbers, in the respect it commands and in 
negotiating power. The national government tried to destabilize the movement through 
a criminalization of the “escraches” (protests staged outside the homes of politicians). 
However, accusations against the movement were not well received by the public and 
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attempts to weaken the power of the PAH failed. Instead, polls indicate that 81% of the 
population supported the actions of the PAH in this period (metroscopia, 2013).  
Figure 5: Media Coverage Devided by Topic 
 
 
Source: Elaboration of authors with data collected from newspaper articles “El País”xxii 
The media mainly (48%) covered actions of civil disobedience, i.e. 
confrontational events such as the “Stop evictions” campaign in which adherents 
gathered in front of the home-to-be-evicted, the “escraches”, occupations of the seats 
of financial institutions or other demonstrations. Very rarely did articles concern the 
organisation of the social movement, collective-advice assemblies, efforts behind the 
scenes or less spectacular actions such as collective negotiations with financial 
institutions. 19% of media coverage was on the impacts on governance institutions (see 
below).  
The broad media coverage of the platform and its actions contributed to its 
reputation, the acquisition of a very broad support base and augmented its negotiation 
power and legitimacy. This presence in the news allowed an impact on multiple levels of 
governance beyond the local level.  
4. Innovation and governance: internal and external relations 
Here we examine how the PAH organizes internally and how the platform developed 
relations with other organizations and institutions. The social base of the PAH consists 
mainly of citizens affected by the mortgage problem. Only a core group has not 
experienced a financial housing problem. The majority of members are adults, employed 
until recently, but having lost their jobs and with modest income. 
The PAH is a horizontally organized urban movement that regularly discusses 
actions in assemblies. Core groups meet several times a week to discuss strategies and 
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actions. Open assemblies also happen weekly, where people newly affected by mortgage 
problems can join the veterans. Individual experiences are shared publicly and answered 
with advice and human support. The core group and the veterans help the newcomers 
and socialise them into the dynamics of the organization. 
Table 2 : PAH-Barcelona Internal organisation 
Support Base 
“Deprived” Citizens (financial stress, housing problem)  
Age constitution: adults over 25 
Socio-economic class: low and middle class  
Adherents to the movement 
Personal Benefit: reciprocity, solidarity 
Nuclear Group Dedicated, involved members and others experiencing financial stress  
Resources 
Labour: Mostly unemployed with time to participate 
Money: Own fund-raising, Individual Donations, Donations Observatory  
DESC 
Legitimacy: High citizen support  
Network 
Structure 
Horizontal  
Professionalization  
Spokesperson: (charismatic woman) 
Subgroups in charge of different actions  
Decision 
Making 
Consensus by Assembly: no voting 
Representatives in regional and federal meetings 
Leaderless: rotation of Responsibilities, full involvement of everybody  
 
PAH external relations are of two types: relations with private and civil society 
organisations and relations with public institutions (tables 3 and 4). PAH collaborates 
with some significant civil society groups in Barcelona. Below we will explain further how 
the strong ties with these associations are strategically used to obtain access to 
information and other resourses throughout these networks. These associations offer 
support to the Platform as a whole and to individual members. The relationship with 
financial institutions is conflictive. However, agreements are reached in particular 
instances between the PAH and bank managers to renegotiate debts or even condone 
debts.   
Table 3.  PAH-Barcelona External relations with Private and Civil Society 
organisations  
Private & Civil 
Society 
Territorial Level 
strength of 
ties 
Collaboration Conflict Constraining/Supportive 
FAVB (Federation 
Neighbourhood 
Association BCN) 
Municipal high high no Supportive 
Observatory DESC 
(Social, Economical 
Municipal high high no Supportive 
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and Cultural rights 
Association) 
Labour Unions National low no no  
Other Social 
movements       
(iaio flautas, DRY, 
auditoria de la 
deuda y 15M) 
National medium medium no Supportive 
Caritas 
National &  
Municipal 
low no no  
Financial 
Institutions 
National & 
Municipal 
low no yes Constraining 
 
Table 4. PAH External relations with public institutions 
Public 
Institutions 
Territorial 
Level 
Strength of 
ties 
Cooperation Conflict 
Constraining 
/Supportive 
Ofideuta Barcelona Regional low no no  
“Table Housing 
Barcelona” 
Municipal medium low no  
Municipal Council Municipal low no No/…. Constraining 
Catalan Government Regional low no no Constraining 
National 
Government* 
National low no Yes Constraining 
Judiciary * National medium medium Diminishing Supportive 
European Court of 
Justice* 
European low low no Supportive 
* These external relations apply to PAH-Spain in general and not only to PAH-Barcelona.  
5. Impact on governance: Innovative initiatives.  
Public administrations, civil society organisations and social movements react variously 
to the newly arisen social needs: knowledge about mortgage contracts and legislation, 
information on the rights and responsibilities of people with housing problems, advice 
and assistance in negotiation with financial institutions. It is important to emphasise that 
the actions of the “Platform of the Affected by the Mortgages” have brought a shift in 
public opinion on the problem of mortgage foreclosures and housing evictions, reaching 
their maximum impact in March 2013. The situation of more than 415,000 mortgage 
foreclosures in 2008-2012 period; 244,500 initiations of housing evictions, with almost 
160,000 executed, is now acknowledged as a social issue that requires policy 
intervention.  
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 In Barcelona a new governance frame has been developed by regional and local 
institutions creating a web of organizations, ad-hoc programmes and multi-level 
interactions. Here we briefly introduce the most salient organizations and initiatives that 
constitute innovation in governance without claiming that these innovations are a direct 
result of PAH’s social campaigns. However, how public institutions and civil society 
organizations are creating new forms of coordination to cope with housing issues in the 
wake of the mortgage crisis cannot be disconnected from the strong social and media 
pressure created by the PAH movement.  
5.1. Public actors and actions 
5.1.1. Autonomous Community of Catalonia:” Ofideute”  
 
In 2010 the Autonomous Community of Catalonia started a mortgage debt counselling 
service to respond to the social exclusionary dynamics caused by the crisisxxiii. “Ofideute” 
evolved from a small team providing support in the Barcelona office, to a well known 
entity found all over Catalonia. Its main objective is keeping indebted families from 
ending up homeless. Ofideute is innovative in having established informal agreements 
with financial institutions to have their risk departments connect with a debt mediation 
service of the public administration, thereby establishing a communication channel on 
mortgage problems of vulnerable consumersxxiv. Ofideute’s role is close to Caritas’ whose 
head of the mediation service is the same person who initiated Ofideute in 2010xxv.  
5.1.2. Provincial administration: Mediation Service in Housing Debts (SIDH) 
 
This initiative of the provincial administration Diputació of Barcelona serves to advise 
and support municipal governments. The Social Services department of the Diputació 
offers judicial advice to people without resources on the principle that every citizen is 
entitled to social assistance and social integration. The strength of this service, as that 
of Ofideute, lies in coordination. It offers a communication/mediation channel between 
the financial institution and the individualxxvi. Partnership agreements were established 
with 27 municipalities of the Barcelona region covered by the Diputació. Governance 
based on institutional cooperation in Diputació also involved the housing and Juridical 
Service Orientation departments in the form of a new mediation service on housing debts 
partly using the existing infrastructure of the former Service of Judicial Orientation (SOJ). 
Communication also flows between this organism and the leading members of PAH and 
of Caritas. 
5.1.3. Municipal level: Advisory Board on Social Housing (“Consell de ‘l Habitatge 
Social de Barcelona”) 
 
The Advice Board on Social Housingxxvii (ABSH) emerged from one of the thematic boards 
of the “Consell de la Ciutatxxviii”: the participatory organ of the municipality of Barcelona. 
The ABSH formed in 2007 within the framework of the “Consorci de l’habitatge de 
Barcelona”: the municipality’s and the autonomous community’s overarching body on 
housing at the municipal level. The ABSH was designed to function as a participatory 
and consultative structure concerning all issues of housing policy in Barcelona. It 
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encourages participation of different stakeholders xxix in housing issues: civil society 
organizations, private institutions managing social housing services, etc. The 
Observatory DESC, which collaborates closely with the PAH, is member of the ABSH, as 
is the FAVB (Federation of Neighbourhood Associations of Barcelona). Also, the 
ombudswoman is always invited and informed as a visiting member of the Board.  
5.1.4. Municipal Government of Barcelona –“ Servicio Asesoramiento” 
 
Barcelona municipality has reacted in multiple ways to the housing crisis. It has created 
a new coordination function involving different departments (social services and the 
housing area). Within mediation the municipality there are forty offices of Social Services 
and ten offices of housing where people with housing problems are attended. They have 
organized their own service between owners and tenants. In some cases financial help 
makes rent more accessible for tenants, to pay deposits or deal with accumulated debt. 
Some kind of social rent is created through subvention of the private rental marketxxx.  
The most innovative initiative of the municipality of Barcelona, supported and 
promoted by the ABSH, was to form the Mixed Commission on Housing Evictions in 
February 2011. The formation of this commission was an important political act, because 
through this the municipality acknowledges the existence of a structural problem of 
housing eviction, both rental and property-related, and of social-exclusion dynamics due 
to the financial crisis. The PAH is an official member of this Mixed Commission. This is 
the only innovative participatory commission of the municipality of Barcelona that 
officially includes the social movement, an example of innovative governancexxxi. 
5.2. Innovative initiatives: Caritas and Civil Society Actors  
5.2.1. Caritas’ Mediation Service in Housing  
In September 2011 Caritas started the Mediation Service in Housing (MSH). Caritas 
mostly runs on individual donations and with volunteers. These funds serve to give 
financial support to households in need. Until June 2013 Caritas owned 250 buildings 
acquired with multiple resources. Caritas established a communication channel with 
financial institutions. This link consists in an agreement with the financial institutions that 
they will cooperate and keep the communication open on all the cases of mortgage 
troubles of socially excluded groups. For Caritas a case is solved when it succeeds in 
renegotiating the mortgage debt, people can stay in their houses with a social rent or 
reach an accord of payment in kind.  
5.2.2. Federation of Neighbourhood Associations (FAVB) “Servicio de Mediación” 
 
The FAVB brings together over 100 neighbourhood organisations in Barcelona. On 
collective housing issues they search for solutions through cooperating with social 
movements and civil society organisations: Laio Flautas, 500*20 15M, Caritas and the 
PAH, all concerned with the deprivation dynamics of the crisis. FAVB members have 
organized their own mediation service where people are attended individually by a lawyer 
and expert in mediation.  
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5.2.3. Observatory DESC 
 
Key members of Observatory DESC overlap with PAH. The Observatory is an umbrella 
organisation that gathers multiple organisations active in economic, social and cultural 
rights. They produce vital knowledge and conduct research useful for the PAH 
movement. The unofficial but strong link between key actors of the PAH and employees 
of the DESC ensures a network and creates a bottom-link towards (public) institutions. 
This clear strategy makes it possible for the social movement to remain their 
confrontational attitude towards public institutions and yet ensure a relation or 
information flow with institutions through the Observatory DESC.  
5.3. Other institutions and governance arrangements:  
 
5.3.1. Ombudsman office 
The national ombudswoman presented a report on the “Economic Crisis and mortgage 
debtsxxxii” in January 2012. She proposed establishing regulations on insolvency of 
natural persons following the practice of most European countries. The report 
recommended that the government should provide a rule that allows “bona fide” debtors 
to remain in their property paying a rent according to circumstances. There should be a 
limitation on the interest on arrears – written into law in 2013, after the verdict of the 
ECJ.  
The Catalonian ombudsman made further recommendations to the regional 
government on housing matters xxxiii , e.g. a free system of restructuration of 
debts xxxiv managed by a public entity which will establish a personalized plan, in 
agreement with the creditor, in order to pay off the obligatory debts. Until an agreement 
is reached, the debtor should not be evicted from his property. The Catalan Ombudsman 
insists that 30% of housing units be destined for social rent.  
5.4. PAH and bottom-linked innovation 
 
So far we have described the strength of the PAH movement and the actions of public 
institutions in the housing crisis particularly in Barcelona. Here we signal the tension 
between the different actors involved. We have been arguing that the PAH is an 
important bottom-up organization in multi-level governance through its social innovation 
capacity and its networks. The PAH movement has acted politically through stressing the 
need to democratize public institutions as well as claiming access to housing as a social 
and human right. Some actions by the PAH (e.g. occupation of buildings) have led some 
public and private housing managers to consider the movement and its claims as radical. 
Despite tensions between the PAH and public bodies there has been some cooperation, 
in instances of “bottom-linked” innovation. “Bottom-linked” innovation means the 
involvement of institutions that enables and sustains citizens’ practices and guarantees 
citizen rights (Pradel et al., 2013). The “bottom-linked” concept is different from either 
bottom-up or top-down, in that the actors involved on either side of the divide come to 
arrangements to solve the problem at hand. In Figure 6 we present the web of 
organizations which cooperate to support the mortgage victims. Either directly or 
through the DESC members of the PAH movement talk and cooperate or enter into 
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dialogue with other associations and with local institutions, thus establishing “bottom-
linked” social innovation. 
 
 
Figure 6. Web of organizations dealing with the housing crisis 
 
 
 
5.5. Multi-level governance: up-scaling and the relation between PAH and institutions 
at other scales 
 
The political actions of the PAH have influenced governance by pushing for the creation 
of new mechanisms for collectively negotiating housing debts with financial institutions. 
It has also politically influenced new local and regional regulations for access to housing 
for mortgage victims. By reframing the issue as a collective instead of an individual debt 
problem its innovative actions have contributed to new ways of conceptualizing and 
approaching policy problems. While governments have used an ‘individual approach’ the 
PAH has focused on collective responses to social problems (Pradel et al., 2013). 
Moreover, by operating at multiple levels (from the local to the European) the PAH 
movement has denounced the lack of transparency of policy making. PAH has used 
different organizational tools and networks to generate opportunities for gaining 
relevance in a multi-level governance context. It has achieved legitimacy and exposed 
the inaction of political parties to a broad situation of social injustice. It has reached 
European institutions and has thus proved to be a very successful political movement.  
 
In late 2011 the existing PAH local platforms had a first general assembly 
constituting a national federation (Colau & Alemany, 2012). This up-scaling of the PAH 
platform coincided with the development of initiatives at the regional, national and 
European scales.  
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We have already referred to actions at the regional level in Catalonia and in 
Andalusia. The Catalonia and Valencia Communities have agreed, moreover, with the 
Judiciary for Social Service to be informed of court rulings on evictions in order to 
coordinate actions. Interaction between PAH and the national government and 
parliament has not been easy. The national government has constrained the actions of 
PAH by trying to de-legitimise their campaigns. However, public opinion and pressure 
from European institutions forced the central government to introduce a change in the 
law to alleviate mortgage payments for families in extremely vulnerable conditions.  
 
The greatest impact of the PAH actions on governance was at the European scale. 
The Europeanization of the Spanish housing crisis occurred when a Spanish lawyer asked 
a preliminary question at the European Court of Justice in a case in which Mohammed 
Aziz would be evicted from his home in a process wherein he was unable to defend 
himself in court. The Spanish lawyer also asked Court how the disequilibrium should be 
interpreted when contractual clauses were not negotiated individually with the 
contractor. The Advocate General of the ECJ answered that the national judge should 
interpret the abusive character of the clauses. On these bases the mortgage contract 
can either be invalidated or undone.  
 
The ECJ ruling on 14/03/2013, public pressure, and support for the People’s 
Legislative Initiative (ILP) – drafted by the PAH movement – obliged the Spanish 
government to take the ILP in consideration and to modify the Mortgage Law and Civil 
Procedure to adjust the imbalance between creditor and individual debtor. On May 14 
the Spanish Parliament voted a new law to “reinforce the protection of mortgage 
debtors”. This new standard still leaves very little leeway for lawyers and judges. Only 
under very strict and extreme conditions is debt settlement is allowed. However, the 
modification of this law and the internationalization (up-scaling) of the problem have led 
to social innovation in power relations between mortgage debtors and creditors. 
Moreover, the ECJ judgment gives more autonomy to Spanish judges to decide on 
abusive clauses and abusive interests on arrears. A number of judges have used this 
autonomy to rule against evictions.  
5.5.1. Ruling European Court of Human Rights (16/10/2013) 
A court hearing in Girona ordered the eviction of a house occupied by the PAH 
movement. This house, owned by the national ‘bad bank’ SAREB, housed 43 mortgage 
victims. When 16 families were ordered to leave the building their lawyer appealed the 
ruling. The European Court of Human Rights decided that the court decision conflicted 
with the international right on housing and postponed the eviction at least one month, 
or until the authorities can offer alternative lodging. As a result of this ruling of the ECHR, 
the PAH and their demands gained legitimacy. 
5.5.2. European Central Bank 
The European Central Bank pointed out in a recent statement signed by its president, 
Mario Draghi, directed to the Spanish government that they should provide a broader 
regulative context than the limited adjustments made so far. The recommendation of 
the ECB president is that the Spanish government should address the underlying causes 
of problems related to the mortgage loans and should try to avoid mortgage foreclosures 
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insofar as possible, while keeping up the proper economic incentives and avoiding moral 
hazard.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper presents a case of social innovation by organized citizens fighting for social 
justice. The impact of the financial and economic crisis in Spain has had a very specific 
feature: the loss of homes for thousands of families over a very short period of time. 
The scale of the social crisis created by a financial crisis partly explains the emergence 
of a bottom-up collective response.  
The PAH movement developed with a very broad social base. Family members 
affected by the loss of their homes joined the movement becoming active members 
creating a horizontal web of relations based on community support and solidarity. Their 
actions provided information and knowledge to citizens to deal with evictions but also to 
confront financial institutions. With local public administrations the PAH movement has 
acted as a pressure group for institutional action supporting citizens, including changing 
practices and legislation.   
One characteristic of a successful social movement is visibility. Our research 
shows that the PAH movement achieved considerable visibility in the public sphere over 
a short period of time. This resulted from the presence of the movement in the media 
showing the human, concrete suffering caused by instances of social injustice. However, 
the presence of the PAH actors in the public sphere could not have been possible without 
systematic organization at the city neighbourhood level. 
Our analytical perspective shows the emergence and consolidation of a successful 
social movement as an example of social innovation because it aims beyond denunciation 
and protest to actually providing (facilitating) material resources not provided by the 
market or the state. The failure of public and private institutions in Spain to provide 
solutions for the loss of homes created the opportunity for the socially innovative political 
action of the PAH movement. However, social actors involved in socially innovative 
practices find important opportunities and constraints in realizing their projects. Many of 
these opportunities and constraints are related to how institutions respond to innovation. 
But also to how civil society organizations and social movements approach institutions.  
The institutionalization of socially innovative practices is crucial for social-
innovation projects to last and for achieving long-term effects. Institutionalization is 
mainly recognition of objectives and actors as legitimate and the support of public 
authorities. Institutions may be receptive at first to bottom-up initiatives and then 
incorporate some of the innovative practices into policy making. In the case of the PAH 
movement in Barcelona and Catalonia local institutions were open to develop 
mechanisms of negotiation with financial institutions to deal with the mortgage crisis. 
Similar processes happened in other cities of Spain. However, cooperation between the 
PAH movement and institutions remained ambiguous. Although they shared information 
and participated in formal housing commissions and cooperate in some instances the 
PAH kept an openly critical approach to insufficient policy action of administrations. We 
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have argued that this is a case of bottom-linked social innovation on the bases of existing 
tension, cooperation and dialogue between public institutions and the PAH movement. 
Finally, the impact of mobilization on international institutions through pressure 
on the Spanish parliament to change legislation is a demonstration of the strength the 
PAH movement. Often institutionalization of this kind involves “up-scaling” of social 
innovation in multilevel governance. Higher levels of governance beyond the local carry 
responsibility for maintaining/improving universal access to welfare resources. This 
question is particularly relevant in the current economic and political context of welfare 
state retrenchment. 
i The paper results from research conducted under COST Action IS 1102 during 2012 and 2013. 
ii GPD per capita rose from 72.5% in 1985 to 97.2% in 2004 compared with EU15 members.  
iii Large real- estate companies, together with banks, companies involved in housing price appraisal and notaries most 
influenced housing price inflation and creation of the bubble because of their large presence in the real-estate sector. 
iv Ley de Enjuiciamiento  Civil art. 579/698 (2000-PP). Art. 579 of the Civil procedure says  “in case of the auction of 
the property mortgaged or pledged, and where the product is insufficient to cover the claim, the claimer may request 
the initiation of (mortgage) executions for the missing amount of the total debt, and the execution will continue 
according to the ordinary rules applicable to every execution”. 
v Exact number of initiated mortgage foreclosures during 2008-2012 in Spain: 415117; in Catalonia: 79 699 (C.G.P.J.) 
vi Decreto de 8 febrero 1946, Ley Hipotecaria 
vii Ley de Enjuiciamiento civil, art. 1911: “del cumplimiento de las obligaciones responde el deudor con todos su bienes, 
presentes y futuros” 
viii Art. 695 of Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil limits the possibilities of plea to only calculation errors or liquidation of debts.  
ix The main promoters of the Platform were familiar with housing problems in Spain and had already founded a low- 
profile social movement “V por Vivienda” in 2006 that focused on the inaccessibility of housing for low income 
population, especially young people. 
x Deprivation of human needs: material and currently also democratic participation. 
xi The workshop was held on 17th september 2013,  http://www.cost-is1102-cohesion.unirc.it/national-
pages/spain/barcelona-action-unit 
xii Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca, http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com, consulted on 2/04/2013 
xiii The General Council of the Judicary compiles the most accurate data on the Spanish mortgage foreclosures and 
evictions. However, the notaries, property registrars and the National Bank of Spain all report different data.  
xiv http://www.metroscopia.org/datos-recientes/tag/metroscopia-dinamico/PAH, consulted in march 2013 
xv CIS, Centre of Sociological reseach, 
http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/EN/11_barometros/Indicadores_PI/documentos/serGobOpo1.html 
xvi El País, 30/03/2010 http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2010/03/30/actualidad/1269934384_850215.html 
xvii Ley del Derecho a la Vivienda 18/2007 : this law was established under the left coalition government. 
xviii The list of the Municipalities that have approved the motion can be found on 
http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/mociones-ayuntamientos/ and El País, 23/02/2014 
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/02/21/actualidad/1393010178_488272.html 
xix A left majority: IU & PSOE, voted on 09/04/2013 
xx Real Decreto Ley 27/2012, 15 noviembre,  Medidas urgentes para reforzar la protección a los deudores hipotecarios  
xxi Ley 1/2013, de 14 de mayo, de medidas para reforzar la protección a los deudores hipotecarios, reestructuración de 
deuda y alquiler social 
xxii By means of analysis of 470 articles on the PAH published in el País between 01/2012 and 04/2013 
xxiii The initiative of this new project was Carmen Trilla’s, secretary of housing at that moment. 
xxiv Ofideute has agreed with financial institutions to have a single contact person, mostly in the risk department, to 
whom Ofideute sends the debt settlement proposals of each case they receive.  
xxv Two other people who formed the nuclear group of Ofideute: Joana Suñer and a financial expert have also moved 
from Ofideute to Caritas, apparently because of a lack of funding.  
xxvi However, financial institutions are not obliged to accept mediation in case of payment arrears on mortgage 
contracts: people depend entirely on the goodwill of the financial institution in each particular case. This is the case for 
each mediation service.  
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